Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety, said Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790), one of the Founding Fathers of the United States in 1759. More than 200 years later the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann brought forward the scientific illumination of Franklins famous words: The outside world knows no risks, for it knows neither distinctions, nor expectations, nor evaluations, nor probabilities – unless self-produced by observer systems in the environment of other systems (2008: 6).
From this constructivist perspective he conceptualizes risk as one side of a modern distinction. Whereas the dichotomy of risk/security had been the dominant form of observation in premodern times, the process of functional differentiation changed our risk-consciousness. Given the concept of an uncontrollable future, more research or better knowledge cannot lead to security as they reveal hitherto unconsidered aspects. In the course of modernity security was replaced by danger. While risk is attributed to own decisions, danger reflects being subject to the consequences of external decisions. If one operates within the logic of risk/danger, the rationality of security disappears. For instance, in modern societies, earthquakes are no longer considered as fatalism, but as risk of moving to non-earthquake-proof buildings or areas. Or the risk to invest in mortgage assets which had promised advantage, and months later it can turn into failure due to the cumulative effects of a financial crisis.
All actions contain two sides. As a matter of fact, to act, or even not to act, poses risks. Decision and loss depend on the observer and on time. Social complexity and uncertainty imply not only the risk of turning high expectations into disadvantages (called by Harrison/March 1984 post-decisional regret), but also the opportunity that decisions can result in unanticipated chances (post-decisional surprise). Consequently, the shift from absolute security of a God-given or state-controlled world to a free and individualized society entails not only losses, but more options. Without an uncertain future one would neither be able to observe nor to exercise freedom of speech or opinion. Put differently, liberty involves risk and danger. There is no way back to the paradise of an idealized and ominous safety. – What a post-decisional surprise of the Fall of Man to risk it!
What role does security then play in modern societies? Though, knowledge is never complete, security cannot be rejected in any sense. There are two functional ways to be distinguished. First, as a fictive mechanism to establish a certain kind of action rationality (Nils Brunsson 1985) overestimation of control is functional in order to pursue an action at all. If an engineer took only the position of a reflective observer while laying cables, he wouldn’t be able to act at all. Rationality in modern times can only be applied to decisions which enlarge options and take into account as many views and aspects as possible. Instead, if one pretends to solve complex problems by insisting only on absolute security, it becomes a risk itself and a danger to others.
Second, the universal problem of security has a political dimension. Security policies can transform absolute values into negotiable political interests: Viewed as political interests that are not normatively defendable, social problems are more likely to be set on political agendas. As alleged health, military, financial or ecological security policies democratic parties can thus politicize every aspect of life. Even the omission to prevent an action can turn into political risks itself, because the failure of taking adequate measures will probable be used or criticized by the opposing wing. It is, however, hardly possible to find a true consensus between decision-makers and those who are concerned with it. Decision and loss depend on whether they are seen from a risk– or from a danger-perspective. Finally, any security measures result in risks for politicians. Meanwhile, they entail the danger of overregulation and of leaving liberty behind at the expense of the people. The safest of all wisdoms in modern individualized societies is thus: There is none.
References
Brunsson, Nils 1985: The irrational organization: irrationality as a basis for organizational action and change. Chichester. New York: Wiley.
Harrison, J. Richard & March, James G. 1984: Decision Making and Postdecision Surprises. Administrative Science Quarterly. Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 26-42.
Luhmann, Niklas 2005: Risk: a sociological theory. 1. edition. New Brunswick: Aldine Transaction.
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